That the assassination portended much wider and more serious implications than a mere quarrel between Austria and Serbia derives from the fact that nearly two decades of arms escalation, imperialist rivalry, fear and mistrust had produced two blocs of mutually suspicious European great powers whose destinies became entangled in a web of alliances and illusions about their 'rightful' place in an insecure world. Austria was such a great power and her every action in the international sphere (in this case holding Serbia to account for the assassination) would be monitored by her rival Russia lest it threaten her security or prestige. But any Russian challenge would expect an answer from Austria's loyal ally, Germany' whose challenge to Russia would invite the attention of the latter country's ally, France. And could the world's foremost power, Britain, be expected to ignore the menace of such events. Such a series of events had already taken place in Europe in 1908-09 over the Bosnian Annexation crisis which was resolved through Russia's humiliating climbdown in face of Germany's threat. It was Russia's response in the crisis of July 1914 set that set in train the elements of an ancient Greek tragedy that hurtled the European peoples into the cauldron of terrible war.
Bibliography: L. Albertini, The Origins
of the War of 1914
S.B. Fay, The Origins of the World War
I. Geiss, July 1914
Selected Cast of Characters:
Note: For convenience, Austria-Hungary is denoted as Austria throughout
....In discussion between Berchtold and Count Tisza (Hungarian prime minister), the latter warns of Russian intervention and is doubtful about German support. Decision made to first ascertain the position of Austria's ally Germany
Problem for the 'war party' in the Austrian government is to secure the agreement of the reluctant Tisza, an effort that took two weeks
In a letter to the Kaiser, the Austrian emperor asserts Austria's aim is to "isolate and diminish" Serbia (via territorial adjustments in favor of other Balkan states) and thus eliminate Serb influence in the Balkans (i.e., southeastern Europe)
The Austrian investigation discloses that the plot had been hatched in the Serb capital Belgrade and implicated a Serb employee of one of the government ministries as well as Serb army officers. There is no evidence that the Serb government is implicated in the plot
....Bethmann-Hollweg (German chancellor) advises that Austria "may be sure that His Majesty (the Kaiser), in accordance with his treaty obligations and old friendship, will stand by Austria's side," thus endorsing the Kaiser's 'blank check' of July 5. The decision is to be Austria's
Greatly encouraged by these assurances, Berchtold hopes that the crisis can be contained by a localized war against Serbia alone
...At meeting of the Austrian Council of Ministers--all but Tisza (fearful of Russian intervention) urge military action. Berchtold urges that any diplomatic action taken should "only end in war." Agreement is concluded on presenting an ultimatum, with the hint that it should be so framed as to be unacceptable to Serbia, thus preparing the way for war. Berchtold states: "A war with Russia would be the most probable consequence of our entering Serbia." Count Hoyos, direct from Berlin, reports the German promise of unconditional support to Austria
The German ambassador to Austria reports to his government that the ultimatum will be delivered to Serbia on July 25 [it was actually delivered on July 23]
The Serb prime minister, Pasitch, goes off on an election tour for the pending Serb elections to parliament; did not return to Belgrade until Jul 24
(A French newspaper commenting on points V and VI of the note suggested it required from Serbia an "acknowledgment of vassalage")
The French delegation leaves St. Petersburg, having affirmed their obligations under the Franco-Russian alliance
Austria informs the governments of Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy and Turkey of her ultimatum to Serbia (Note that its general contents were given to the German government by Austria some two weeks earlier, though this was not acknowledged by either)
Berchtold, Austrian foreign minister, notes: "Any conditional acceptance [of the ultimatum], or one accompanied by reservations, is to be regarded as a refusal"
On being informed of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, declares "It's a European war"
Russian Council of Ministers resolves to: request Austria to prolong its time limit and not to engage in hostilities; advise Serbia not to oppose an Austrian invasion; request the tsar to authorize partial mobilization[i.e., along the Austrian border only]
Discussion between Sazonov and the (Russian) army Chief of Staff re Sazonov's idea of partial mobilization despite the fact that Army H.Q. had planned for a general mobilization (i.e., against both Austria and Germany). Partial mobilization approved in principle by the tsar, though not to be carried out until Jul 28
The French ambassador at St. Petersburg urges a "policy of firmness" on Sazonov.[Note that the French leaders have left Russia at this point; it is believed by some that the ambassador was going beyond his authority in thus attempting to stiffen Russian resolve]
Interview between French ambassador and Grey in which the former tries to wake up the British foreign minister to the realization that it would be too late for mediation once Austria moved against Serbia
Grey (with less than a day before the expiration of the ultimatum) urges the German ambassador to attempt a four-power (i.e., Germany, Britain, France and Italy) mediation at Vienna and extension of the time-limit set by Austria
Sir Eyre Crowe, British foreign office official notes: "Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Serbia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom"
Russian Ministerial Council meeting in the presence of the tsar. The issue: partial mobilization of the army against Austria alone (as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure for moderation), or general mobilization against both Germany and Austria. Decision is made for the less dangerous alternative of partial mobilization against the wishes of the army chiefs (Note the intense pressure on Russia, out of concern for her prestige as a Great Power, not to leave her Slavic brother Serbia in the lurch; the decision for mobilization, even partial, is crucial, for it would be regarded in Austria and Germany as "a sure step towards war")
The French begin secret military preparations (recall of troops overseas, etc.)
The German ambassador informs Sir E. Grey that his government had no prior knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum [a lie!]. Grey replies:" . . .between Serbia and Austria I [feel] no title to intervention, but as soon as the question became one between Austria and Russia it was a question of the peace of Europe, in which we must all take a hand"
The Kaiser, on a memorandum sent by the German ambassador to Russia regarding Sazonov's’ view that Austria's "swallowing" of Serbia would mean Russia would go to war with Austria, notes: "All right! Let her . . ." [Note the comments of former German chancellor von Bulow on the Kaiser as related in his memoirs: " . . . he never led an army in the field. . . He was well aware that he was neurasthenic, without real capacity as a general, and still less able, in spite of his naval hobby, to have led a squadron or even captained a ship"]
Report of Austrian ambassador to Germany on the state of mind of the German government: "Here it is universally taken for granted that an eventual negative reply by Serbia will be followed by a declaration of war from [Austria] . . . Any delay in commencement of military operations is regarded here [i.e., by the German government] (as presenting) a great danger of the interference of other Powers. They urgently advise us to go ahead and confront the world with a fait accompli . . . The German government tenders the most binding assurances [to Austria] that it in no way associates itself with the (English) proposals (for mediation); is even decidedly against their being considered, and only passes them on in order to conform to the English request" [According to the Austrian chief-of-staff, 16 days would be required before operations could begin, but, under German pressure, it is decided to declare war on July 28]
Germany replies to Grey's mediation: the Kaiser notes "It is futile, I will not join in"
Grey proposes to the German ambassador that if Austria and Russia both mobilize, the other Powers (Britain, Germany, France, Italy) should attempt to get them to negotiate before any crossing of each other's frontiers
The Austrian emperor signs the order for mobilization. (The Serbs, however, fairly confident of Russian support, decline to do the one thing that might avoid an escalation, namely, capitulate entirely to the Austrian demands. It is probable, however, that such submission would have prompted further Austrian claims, such as payment for the costs of mobilization . . .)
The German ambassador at St. Petersburg suggests to Sazonov that he intervene in an effort to moderate the Austrian demands. Sazonov admits to the ambassador that "certain military preparations had already been taken to avoid surprises" but that mobilization would not be ordered until Austria had crossed the Serb frontier
Grey, via the German ambassador, requests the German government to use its influence with Austria to get her to negotiate with the Serbs
Sazonov discusses the Austrian ultimatum with the A-H ambassador. He finds paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 to be unacceptable and hopes A-H will tone down its demands on Serbia; rejected by Austria
The German ambassador in London reports to his government Britain's request for German pressure on Austria to accept the Serbian reply to the ultimatum and be "restrained from prosecuting a . . . foolhardy policy" of "crushing" Serbia that would surely escalate into an Austro-Russian conflict
The German Kaiser returns to Berlin from his interrupted Scandinavian cruise (though having been informed of developments during his absence from Berlin)
Britain decides to concentrate its fleet in home ports (i.e., be ready for action), a move that causes panic on the German stock exchange
[Some historians have accused Bethmann-Hollweg of playing a double game--pretending to cooperate with Russia and Great Britain while urging on Austria: note that the Kaiser's proposal was not forwarded to Vienna until the following day, after war had been declared]
6 p.m. Austria declares war on Serbia (brought forward from the planned date of August 12 under pressure from Germany). German government advised that "no aggressive intention exists on the part of Russia towards Germany"
Partial mobilization (i.e., against Austria only) ordered by Russia in the wake of the Austrian declaration of war and presumed imminent invasion of Serbia. (Reports reaching the German government from Russia indicate public opinion there assuming a measure of Austrian bad faith and desire for war in that country's rejection of an "extremely compliant" Serb reply to the Austrian note)
Note Sazonov's dilemma: his desire to avoid war prompts him to
put the kind of pressure on Austria (via mobilization) that would make
her draw back from the brink. But in doing so invites German support
for Austria that would make war inevitable unless Russia made a
humiliating climbdown, as in the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9.
Besides, the promise of German help serves to stiffen Austria not to
hold back.
[Some historians feel, therefore, that it would have been better for
the Russians to have avoided a hasty reaction]
The French army chief advises the Russian military attache of France's "full and active readiness faithfully to execute her responsibilities as an ally"
Bethmann-Hollweg's directive to the German ambassador to Austria: " It is imperative that the responsibility for the eventual extension of the war among those nations not originally immediately concerned, should, under all circumstances, fall on Russia . . . you will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back. The case is solely one of finding a way to realize Austria's desired aim, that of cutting the vital cord of the Greater Serbian propaganda, without at the same time bringing on a world war, and, if the latter cannot be avoided in the end, of improving the conditions under which we shall have to wage it . . ."
(Note the attitude of Italy, ally of both Germany and Austria: declined to act with Austria whose "ultimatum was so aggressive and inept as to be unacceptable to Italian and European public opinion")
Britain indicates to Germany that she would not remain neutral in a war involving Germany and France. Warns the German ambassador on urgent need for mediation. Preparations authorized for immediate mobilization of the fleet
The Kaiser attempts to induce Russia to negotiate with Austria; Russian reply is conciliatory but the tsar counters with a proposal to submit the matter for arbitration at the International Court at the Hague (dubbed 'Nonsense' by the Kaiser) and a request that the German emperor "do what you can to stop your ally from going too far." The tsar, encouraged by the Kaiser's apparent desire for peace, suspends the order for general mobilization of the Russian armed forces and, instead, against the wishes of the army chiefs, orders partial mobilization
The German government advises Russia that Russian military measures would force Germany to mobilize, rendering war all the more inevitable
Berchtold, cognisant of Russia's partial mobilization order, tries to induce Germany to mobilize against Russia and thus force a climbdown similar to that in 1909 over the Bosnian crisis
The German chancellor promises Britain that in a general war
there would be no annexation of French territory in Europe by Germany
if Great Britain remained neutral in the impending conflict. He would
give no assurance about respecting the neutrality of Belgium (which was
a main concern of G.B.), indicating that she would have to yield to
'military necessity' as judged by army HQ [i.e., accord with the
Schlieffen (war) Plan]. All this was rejected by Britain as a virtual
"intention to violate Belgian neutrality"
[Apparently both Germany and Austria believed that their combined
strength would induce the other powers to back off--a grave
miscalculation]
The German Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke, offers his
views on the crisis to Bethmann-Hollweg:
(a) A-H could not go to war against Serbia without mobilizing against
Russia out of fear for her security;
(b) Austrian mobilization woould make an Austro-Russian clash
inevitable;
(c) Grmany would therefore have to mobilize against Russia to protect
Austria
Moltke envisions a war "which will annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come"
The tsar signs orders for both partial and general (full) mobilization pending institution of one or the other as military considerations decree. On this same day the order for mobilization against Austria alone (i.e., partial mobilization) is issued. Thus, Russia is prepared to mobilize against Austria even though Austria has not herself mobilized against Russia
Bethmann-Hollweg passes on Britain's warning to Austria and suggests acceptance of the British proposals for four-power mediation. Now, after the eleventh hour, Bethmann comments: "We must urgently and emphatically commend to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet [i.e., the Austrian government] the acceptance of mediation"
France, though anxious that no pretext be given for escalating the crisis, orders military preparations for protection of her frontier with Germany; though no troops were to move closer than about 6 miles to the German border. The French government assures Britain that "France, like Russia, will not fire the first shot"
Sir E. Grey rejects the German request for British neutrality: " . . . to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."
Bethmann-Hollweg advises Austria that, in view of the opposition of Britain and likely lack of support from Italy, she should undertake only minimal measures against Serbia (the occupation of Belgrade, perhaps) and thus avoid a wider war among the powers (Note that German plans have been seriously dented by probable British support for Russia and France
Austria gives no support to Bethmann-Hollweg's proposal, thus prompting the following reply from the German chancellor: "We are ready . . to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by [Austria] into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice" (a changed attitude apparently motivated by the hardening attitude of Britain)
In a communication to the Kaiser, the Russian tsar admits that Russian secret military preparations had begun on July 24. The Kaiser, surmising bad faith negotiations by the Russians, ceases his attempts at mediation (perhaps a ploy to have Russia later branded as an aggressor)
The French president attempts to get Britain to declare her intention to support France so as to induce moderation from Germany. The British remain non-committal, wishing to avoid commitments announced in advance
6 p.m. The tsar, under intense pressure from the military, orders general mobilization to come into effect next day, thus making a general war almost inevitable. Apparently the Russian government believed, mistakenly, that German had begun her own mobilization
Under pressure from the military, the German chancellor demands withdrawal of the Russian mobilization order, a circumstance that would be most unlikely considering Russia's recent (1909) loss of face over the Bosnian crisis---her status as a great power would thereby be gravely lessened
The German government conveys its views on the crisis as a guide to its foreign ambassadors: "The final object of the Panslavic [i.e., Greater Serbia] agitations carried on against Austria-Hungary is . . . the destruction of the Danube Monarchy [i.e., the Austro-Hungarian empire], the breaking-up or weakening of the Triple Alliance (of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy), and, as a result, the complete isolation of the German empire. Accordingly, our own self-interest summons us to the side of Austria-Hungary"
British memorandum to France and Germany requests assurances that Belgian neutrality would be respected. France gives an immediate unqualified assurance; Germany ignores the request
Noon. Germany receives word of the Russian mobilization, thus giving her the 'green light' (and justification before the German people) to move against Russia and her ally France in accordance with her long-held war plans.
1 p.m. Following the Russian mobilization, Germany proclaims a state of "threatening danger of war," preparatory to actual mobilization
Conversation between Grey and the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, in which the latter asked whether England would help France if she were attacked by Germany. Grey’s reply, indicative of his ‘wait-and-see’ attitude even at this late date, was: " . . . as far as things had gone at present . . . we could not undertake any definite engagement"[!]
7 p.m. Germany asks France to declare its intentions within 18 hours. France replies that she will "act in accordance with her interests" (It was later discovered that if France had opted for neutrality, Germany would have demanded the turning over to Germany of her vital frontier fortresses of Toul and Verdun, to be held as a pledge of French neutrality until the end of the war with Russia!!)
Midnight. Germany demands suspension of the Russian war measures within 12 hours; rejected by Russia the next day
Telegram of the German Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke, to his Austrian counterpart, Conrad: " . . . mobilize at once against Russia [which had mobilized on the previous day]. Germany will mobilize" [This is now in sharp contrast with the pacific stance of the politician Bethmann and that of the Emperor]
Austria orders general mobilization
General mobilization ordered by Germany at 5 p.m.
Germany declares war on Russia at 6 p.m.
Italy declares herself to be neutral on the grounds that Austria was engaged on an aggressive war and hence withdraws from the Triple Alliance
7 p.m. German demand for benevolent Belgian neutrality (drafted since July 26) and access to German troops
Germany concludes treaty of alliance with Turkey
6.15 p.m. Germany declares war on France
Note: Alone of the European powers, Italy, economically weak and militarily unprepared, did not enter the war in 1914. Although a member of the Triple Alliance along with Germany and Austria-Hungary, she had underlying problems with her former enemy Austria; distrusting that country’s ambition to spread its influence in the Balkans, for parts of which Italy had ambitions of her own. She did enter the war in 1915 on the side of the Allies, under the promise of territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Austria.